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COMMENT

KELLY JUDE HUNT*

International Environmental
Agreements in Conflict with GATTGreening GATT after the Uruguay
Round Agreement
Environmental protection has become an increasingly important issue on the
international public agenda. At the same time, liberalization of trade around the
globe receives a significant amount of attention from those involved in international affairs. As a result, environmental and trade policies become intertwined
and sometimes tangled.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) started in 1948 and
now includes 123 countries.' GATT principles and disciplines attempt to promote
increased market access and expansion of trade.2 Many environmental treaties

Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article in any not-forprofit publication or handout provided such reproduction acknowledges original publication in this
issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the author.
*J.D. Candidate, 1996, Southern Methodist University; Associate Comments Editor, Southern
Methodist University School of Law Student Editorial Board, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. Some Answers About GATT and Its Treaty, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 29, 1994, at

C8 [hereinafter Some Answers]. The roots of GATT are in a U.S.-British agreement to lower U.S.
tariff barriers and reduce Britain's trade preference for Commonwealth countries. Amy Kaslow,
U.S. Congress Dims Future of GATT, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1994, at 1. Since that

agreement, many negotiating rounds have been held, involving many more countries, and producing
many different accords. Id.
2. Paul Cough, Trade-Environment Tensions, EPA JOURNAL, Apr.-June 1993, at 29.
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try to restrict or prevent trade of environmentally damaging products. 3 While
GATT rules limit restrictions on trade, many environmental treaties require these

restrictions, and conflicts inevitably arise.4
The Uruguay Round agreement, signed on April 14, 1994, establishes the new
World Trade Organization (WTO) as successor to GATT and promises to slash
tariff and nontariff barriers to world trade.5 While the WTO may address the
inherent conflict between trade and the environment in the years to come, it should

more immediately place great emphasis on ensuring better policy coordination
and cooperation regarding the relationship between trade and the environment.
Section I of this comment defines the scope of the conflicting interests from the
point of view of both supporters and critics of GATT. Section II further defines
the scope of the problem by focusing on specific conflicting agreements. Section
III describes the WTO and other aspects of the Uruguay Round agreement. Finally, Section IV suggests methods of addressing the problems involved in promoting free trade while protecting the environment.

I. Defining the Conflict
A. GATT

SUPPORTERS

The trade-environment issue has two equally plausible sides. One must appreciate both sides in order to better understand the overall problem and formulate

a workable solution. Supporters of GATT's free trade provisions believe that
GATT will not stand in the way of implementing trade provisions of agreements
that have broad international support. 6 At the same time, trade officials are concerned that international trade agreements may be undermined by environmental
protection measures. 7 Officials argue that using trade sanctions is not a costeffective method of obtaining compliance with environmental agreements! Instead, adopting proper environmental policies can ensure that trade liberalization
3. Betsy Baker, Protection, Not Protectionism:MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements and the
GAIT, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437, 439 (1993).
4. GATT Biased Against Protection of Environment, Worldwatch Report Says, 16 Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 248 (Apr. 7, 1993) [hereinafter GATT Biased].
5. GAiT: Over 100 Nations Sign Accord to Cut Barriers to World Trade, Int'l Envtl. Daily
(BNA) D2 (Apr. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Over 100 Nations].
6. GAiT: Official Defends Environmental Policy, Cites "Scope" of Trade Measures, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1664 (Sept. 23, 1992) [hereinafter GAT Official]. Trade agreements do not
superintend environmental laws, but they do regulate the use of trade measures for environmental
purposes. Trade agreements, however, yet lack a real policing mechanism to enforce their rules.
Steve Charnovitz, The Regulation of Environmental Standardsby InternationalTrade Agreements,
Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) 16 (Sept. 15, 1993).
7. Trade, Environment MajorChallenge to EnvironmentalPolicy-Makers, OECD Says, 17 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 12 (Jan. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Trade, Environment]. At an Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meeting in December 1993, the general consensus was that the best use of trade restrictions is in the context of environmental agreements that
address transboundary and global problems, and that unilateral measures should be avoided. Id.
8. Daniel C. Esty, GATTing the Greens, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 33.
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results in environmental benefits. 9 Many economists argue that with strong envi-

ronmental policies in place, free trade (especially in such markets as energy and
farming) will lead to more efficient use of resources.' 0 Finance and technology
also have a role to play in resolving environmental problems."
B. GATT CRITICS

Environmentalists criticize the pro-trade bent of GATT and the limited exceptions it grants to preserve human health and natural resources.' 2 According to a
representative of Friends of the Earth, the status of international environmental
agreements remains unclear under GATT after the Uruguay Round negotiations. 13
Jeffrey McNeely of the World Conservation Union takes the criticism of GATT
further by accusing the Uruguay Round agreement of undermining environmental
agreements by prohibiting trade measures that could "enable countries that play
by the rules of an international agreement to penalize others that do not." 14GATT
principles fail to directly recognize or address environmentalists' views that an
item's production and disposal can be one of its intrinsic characteristics.15
C. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF
TRADE-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP

In the debate over trade versus the environment the positive and negative
aspects of the relationship between trade and the environment must be addressed. 16

To optimists, expanding markets and increasing wealth caused by liberalized trade
9. Id. at 35.
10. Trade and the Environment, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25.
11. GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland acknowledges the role of finance and technology
while stating that trade liberalization is the key to producing coordinated policy responses to environmental problems through efficiently allocating resources and generating wealth. Symposium Addresses
Ways New WTO Could Erase Trade, Environment Anomalies, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 12,
at 503 (June 15, 1994) [hereinafter Symposium].
12. According to a report by the Worldwatch Institute, it is critical for GATT to "recognize and
protect the crucial role trade sanctions can play in enforcing and inducing participation in international
environmental agreements." GAT: GATT in "Head-On " Conflictwith Treaties on the Environment,
Worldwatch Report Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 560 (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter "Head-On"
Conflict].
13. Uruguay Round: Panel Hears Diverse Views on Uruguay Round Agreement, Int'l Envtl.
Daily (BNA) D4 (Mar. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Panel].
14. Symposium, supranote 11, at 503. Other flaws in GATT thinking on the environment include
failure to recognize environmental costs in the prices of goods and inability to impose trade restrictions
based on production processes. Official Defends Environmental Policy, Says GATT Rules Give Scope
for Protection, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 595 (Sept. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Official
Defends].
15. Trade and the Environment, supra note 10, at 25.
16. With overlapping trade and environmental objectives, policy making should be guided by
the following principles: keeping markets open and competitive; including proper environmental
prices to ensure realization of the full benefits of the market mechanism; respecting the necessity
of different environmental standards for different countries; and resolving international environmental
SPRING 1996
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may benefit the environment as governments can direct the additional resources
toward environmental restoration and protection.' 7 In addition, while raising
incomes and expectations, market growth creates more interest in ecological
improvements. '8 Yet, the negative aspects of expanded markets caused by free
trade cannot be ignored. Expanded trade may lead to such problems as pollution
havens and the lowest common denominator approach to environmental regulation
as trading partners attempt to harmonize environmental standards. 1" Enabling
polluters to use countries with lax environmental laws as export platforms into
markets with higher standards would penalize virtuous firms staying at home, and
would make raising standards more difficult for environmentalists everywhere. 20
Despite the optimists' view, the additional resources gained from market
growth through trade liberalization may not benefit the environment. For example, the additional resources may neither improve nor protect the environment
because environmental assets can be valued inaccurately and their use may be
distorted by governmental intervention. 2 Economic growth through trade
can
22
be especially damaging where prices do not reflect environmental costs.
While proponents of GATT advocate the most efficient allocation of resources
regardless of their origin, environmentalists believe such resource allocation leads
to environmental damage and ignores other values. 23 Some define the heart of
the problem between trade and the environment as the impossibility of putting
the environment into the framework of neatly drawn national boundaries. 24 Others
say the lack of an environmental institution organized for the sole purpose of
protecting environmental values, the way GATT guards free trade principles,
lies at the center of the conflict. 25 Regardless of the differing definitions and
views, the essential issue is the tension inherent in promoting free trade while
trying to protect the environment. This overall conflict between the concepts of
free trade and environmental protection can be narrowed by focusing on the clash
disputes through multilateral measures. GATT Official, supra note 6. Richard Elgin, director of
GATT's Technical Barriers to Trade and Trade Environment Division, conceived the ideas behind
the above principles. Id.
17. Laurie Henderson and Patricia Walsh, Forginga Link: Two Approaches to IntegratingTrade
and Environment, 20 Alternatives (Information Access Co.) No. 1, at 30 (Nov. 1993).
18. Candice Stevens, The Greening of Trade, OECD OBSERVER, Apr./May 1994, at 32.
19. Henderson, supra note 17, at 30. Environmentalists define the pollution haven problem as
the situation where "dirty" industries attempt to relocate to take advantage of lenient environmental
standards and regulations. Erik Coulter Luchs, Maximizing Wealth with UnilaterallyImposed Environmental Trade Sanctions under the GAIT and the NAFTA, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727, 733
(1994).
20. The Cost of Clean Living, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 67 [hereinafter The Cost].
21. Stevens, supra note 18, at 23.
22. The Cost, supra note 20, at 67.
23. Trade professionals also are increasingly concerned that GATT may not be able to effectively
deal with environmental matters having a trade impact. Michael B. Smith, GATT, Trade, and the
Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533, 534, 538 (1993).
24. Official Defends, supra note 14, at 595.
25. Esty, supra note 8, at 34.
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between GATT principles and disciplines and the trade provisions of specific
international environmental agreements.
H. GATT and International Environmental Agreements
A. GATT

PRINCIPLES

1. Articles I & II
The most-favored-nation clause of GATT article I requires that any favorable treatment extended to one nation by a contracting party automatically
applies to all other parties.26 For example, members must not apply duty to
a product from any GATT member higher than the lowest duty applied to a
like product from any other member country." Similarly, the national treatment clause of article III stipulates that imports from other GATT parties must
be given no less favorable treatment than like products of national origin.2"
Other GATT provisions supplement articles I and 111.29
2. Article XX

Article XX contains exemptions to GATT obligations.3 ° None of these exemptions permit trade measures specifically to protect the environment.3" However,
the article contains some exemptions that justify environmental or conservation
measures. 3 2 Article XX(b) allows enactment of legislation "necessary to protect

26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signatureOct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The basic idea behind GATT (as stated in the preamble) is
to structure international trade "with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full
use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods." Id.
27. Luchs, supra note 19, at 755. The definition of a "like product" is unclear under GATT
and case law. Charnovitz, supra note 6. The prevailing view, however, is that the phrase refers to
the nature of the product itself, not the method of production. Janet McDonald, Greening the GA7T:
HarmonizingFree Trade and EnvironmentalProtection in the New World Order,23 ENVTL. L. 397,
410 (1993).
28. GATT, supra note 26, art. III. The "like products" language of GATT has been interpreted
to mean that no member of GATT can ever impose a differential tariff to goods based on the
externalized environmental harm caused by the production of those goods. Luchs, supra note 19,
at 755-56.
29. For example, in art. II, contracting parties agree to limit the imposition of tariffs and duties
according to specified levels. Applying the principle of reciprocity found in arts. I and III, parties
therefore are required to use tariffs in a nondiscriminatory way while attempting to reduce maximum
tariffs over time. McDonald, supra note 27, at 403.
30. GATT, supra note 26, art. XX. Environmentalists are concerned because art. XX (written
45 years ago) is not very environmentally relevant or current. Smith, supra note 23, at 538. Trade
professionals are also worried that, as a result of outdated art. XX, GATT may not be well equipped
to address environmental matters with a trade impact. Id.
31. McDonald, supra note 27, at 405.
32. Id.
SPRING 1996

168

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

human, animal, or plant life or health."- 33 Article XX(g) enables parties to take
measures that conserve exhaustible natural resources, but only if such measures
are taken in conjunction with domestic restrictions on production or consumption. 34
GATT panels have interpreted these exemptions narrowly. 35 For example, the
panels refuse to allow extrajurisdictional measures. 36 In addition, some argue
that interpretation of article XX provides weak most-favored-nation and national

treatment clauses, further restricting the use of the exemptions for environmental
gains.37
3. Dispute Resolution
GATT dispute resolution procedures are relevant to the trade-environment
controversy. The purpose of the procedures is to restore an acceptable trade
relationship between disputing parties, with the focus on ending the conduct in
conflict with GATT.38 When in dispute, the parties must first engage in bilateral
negotiations and attempt to reach a settlement.39 If the parties do not settle and
one party decides to make a case under GATT, that party approaches the GATT
Council (Council) and alleges that one of its benefits under GATT has been

nullified or impaired. 40
Next, a panel of experts nominated by the Council must investigate the matter. 4'
The panel holds a hearing in which both parties (as well as any other interested

parties) have opportunities to present their cases and to rebut the other side.42

33. GATT, supra note 26, art. XX. In determining whether a trade measure is justifiable under
art. XX, if the measure discriminates on permissible and nonarbitrary bases and serves one of the
purposes specified by art. XX, then the measure comes closer to GATT compatibility. Baker, supra
note 3, at 451.
34. GATT, supra note 26, art. XX.
35. Luchs, supra note 19, at 756-57.
36. Id. at 757. One GATT panel ruled that neither art. XX(b) nor (g) allows the use of measures
that extend beyond the jurisdiction of the party bringing the action. The panel decided against the
exemptions despite the wording of the exemptions, which does not indicate whether the exemptions
were originally intended to have extraterritorial effects. McDonald, supra note 27, at 431.
37. Luchs, supra note 19, at 757. The argued most-favored-nation obligation is found in the
language prohibiting measures that constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries weighing the same conditions. Id. The national treatment clause is read into the language requiring
that measures not be disguised restrictions on international trade. Id.
38. McDonald, supra note 27, at 406.
39. GATT, supra note 26, art. XXIII.
40. McDonald, supra note 27, at 407. The Council is the intercessional executive body comprised
of representatives of most of the members. Id. at 474 n.39.
41. Id. at 407. The contracting parties to GATT must promptly investigate any matter referred
to them. GATT, supra note 26, art. XXIII.
42. McDonald, supra note 27, at 407. Critics of the procedure say that it lacks mechanisms to
consult with scientists and experts on environmental issues, and that it does not require the party
challenging another's environmental measures to have the burden of proof. GA 77: GeneralAgreement
on Tariffs and Trade Will Include Environment, EPA's Reilly Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1892
(Oct. 21, 1992) [hereinafter EPA's Reilly Says].
VOL. 30, NO. 1
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43
The panel then reports its findings of fact and recommendations to the Council.
If the Council adopts the finding that a breach has occurred or that a contracting
party's rights have been infringed, the party in breach must remove the barrier
or stop the infringing activity. 44

B.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

The trade provisions found in GATT can conflict with international environmental agreements that have trade provisions of their own. Three examples of
agreements in possible conflict with GATT are the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species45 (CITES), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer 6 (Montreal Protocol), and the Basel Convention on Trade in Hazardous Waste 47 (Basel Convention).
1. CITES
CITES establishes a method of listing species as threatened or endangered and
prohibits the import or export of the listed species unless experts make a scientific
finding that the trade will not threaten the species' viability. 48 No conflict arises
between GATT and CITES as long as each country enforces nondiscriminatory
bans on the domestic sale of a product; and selective bans are possible if agreed
to by the exporting country. 49 The unlikelihood that a party to CITES will ever
challenge trade restrictions of another party further minimizes the chance of
conflict. 50 In addition, under CITES, parties may trade with nonparties that provide documentation substantially conforming to convention requirements."
In spite of this harmony, a problem can arise when an exporter who has agreed
to a selective ban decides to sell. In this situation, the import ban might conflict
with GATT principles.5 2 In addition, the possibility exists that a nonparty to
CITES could challenge a party's prohibition of imports and exports of a listed

43. McDonald, supra note 27, at 408.
44. Id.
45. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
46. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
47. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 28
I.L.M. 649 (1989).
48. McDonald, supra note 27, at 455. CITES is specifically directed at restricting trade in
endangered species. Id. at 455-56.
49. GATTeryv. Greenery; The Perils ofEco-sanctions,ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 12 [hereinafter GATTery v. Greenery].
50. McDonald, supra note 27, at 456. Thus, no conflicts have emerged between CITES and
GATT since CITES entered into force almost two decades ago. Id.
51. Baker, supra note 3, at 466.
52. GATTery v. Greenery, supra note 49, at 12. Such a dilemma may occur in the case of the
CITES ban on ivory trade as some southern African states decide to sell the product. Id.
SPRING 1996
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species. 53 The likelihood of such a dispute arising lessens in light of the political
pressure placed on nonparties
by the international community to halt trade in
4
endangered species.1
2. Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol attempts to reduce levels of ozone-depleting substances
(controlled substances) in the earth's atmosphere through a system of consumption
and production limitations for parties to the Montreal Protocol, as well as measures that limit trade in such substances with nonparties. 5 Parties to the Montreal
Protocol agree to substantially reduce their use and production of chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), focusing on the goal of overall elimination by 1995.56 Under the
provisions of the Montreal Protocol, parties must ban imports of controlled substances so that the parties may carry out their commitment to reduce domestic
consumption. "
Because ozone-depleting chemicals have become an integral part of commercial
life, any reduction in their use may affect world trade.58 The Montreal Protocol's
restriction on trade in controlled substances discriminates against nonparties and,
therefore, violates the GATT's most-favored-nation obligation. 59 One commentator interprets the Montreal Protocol's language as distinguishing between states
that comply with the Montreal Protocol standards and those that do not, instead
of using the party versus nonparty distinction. 6° According to this argument, the
distinction between compliers and noncompliers is not unacceptable discrimination under GATT if parties applying the same treaty are states in which the same
conditions prevail. 61 Another potential point of conflict involves the Montreal
Protocol's Multilateral Fund, which provides subsidies to developing countries
to assist them in compliance with the Montreal Protocol. 62 This provision may
breach GATT's principle of seeking to eliminate subsidies as undesirable barriers

53. McDonald, supra note 27, at 457. If such a dispute occurs, the Tuna-Dolphin decision
(discussed infra part II.C.) renders the art. XX exemptions inapplicable, because the species would
not be within the territory of the party enforcing the ban. Id.
54. Id.
55. Baker, supra note 3, at 444.
56. McDonald, supra note 27, at450-51. According to Paulo Coutinho, spokesperson for Brazil's
program to reduce CFCs, the Montreal Protocol aims at eliminating CFC use by the year 2006, and
calls for eliminating production by the end of 1995. Brazil Seeks $10 Million from Ozone Fundfor
Private-SectorProgramsto Curb CFCs, 18 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 377 (May 17, 1995). Unfortunately, the new processes that eliminate CFCs cost more than the old, and this cost probably will
be passed on to the consumer. Smith, supra note 23, at 540.
57. McDonald, supra note 27, at 451.
58. Scott N. Carlson, The Montreal Protocol's Environmental Subsidies and GATT: A Needed
Reconciliation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 211, 212 (1994).
59. McDonald, supra note 27, at 451.
60. Baker, supra note 3, at 466.
61. Id.
62. Carlson, supra note 58, at 213.
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to trade.63 In addition, GATT article VI allows parties to impose countervailing
64
duties on products that have benefited from competitive subsidies.
In order to comply with GATT, a party to the Montreal Protocol would have
to establish an exception under GATT article XX(b) or (g). 65 The trade measures
must be aimed primarily at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production
or consumption within the jurisdiction of the acting state. The bans in the Montreal
Protocol have this goal for controlled substances. 66 The problem occurs in meeting
the exceptions' requirement that no measures other than trade bans could reach
the same result. 67
3. Basel Convention
The Basel Convention permits trade in hazardous waste only between parties,
subject to the following conditions: waste may not be transported unless the
exporter has the prior informed consent of the importing party and other parties
in whose territory the waste will travel; a party can only export waste if it lacks
the technical capacity, necessary facilities, and suitable dumping site to dispose
of the waste; and, even with consent, a party may not export waste where the
waste is unlikely to be taken care of in an environmentally sound manner. 68 If
parties do not have a bilateral agreement that meets the terms of the Basel Convention, movements of hazardous waste between parties and nonparties must cease. 69
Concerns about the Basel Convention's provisions under GATT involve discrimination between parties and against nonparties.70 For instance, the prohibition
on exports where the waste will not be managed in an environmentally safe way
could breach the GATT's most-favored-nation obligation and would not qualify
as an exemption because the prohibition would not have been to protect health
under article XX(b).71 With respect to nonparties, the prohibition on trade with
63. Id. Such a conflict may in turn prevent developing countries relying on the Fund from
fulfilling their obligations under the Montreal Protocol. Id.
64. Luchs, supra note 19, at 762.
65. Id. at 759. A party may find showing that the measure was "necessary" under the art.
XX(b) exemption difficult because the party must prove that all other attempts of solving the problem
failed. Similarly, under art. XX(g) proof of the ozone layer as an "exhaustible natural resource"
worthy of protection may be difficult. Id.
66. Baker, supra note 3, at 466-67.
67. Id.
68. McDonald, supra note 27, at 453-54.
69. GA77ery v. Greenery, supra note 49, at 12. Defining the wastes covered by the Basel
Convention may be difficult. Id. For example, wastes sent abroad to have something useful extracted
from them are by definition the raw material for another process and banning trade in them interrupts
free trade between parties differently than does the prohibition of dumping a few drums of chemicals
across national borders. Id.
70. Baker, supra note 3, at 452. While some criticize the Basel Convention as facially discriminatory because of its distinction between parties and nonparties, an argument can be made that the
distinction should be evaluated for its effect as applied, and not automatically declared GATTincompatible on its face. Id.
71. McDonald, supra note 27, at 454.
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nonparties violates GATT's most-favored-nation obligation by discriminating

against nonparties.7" Because the Basel Convention has no option for nonparties

to receive the same treatment as parties, it is open to charges of discrimination
under GATT principles.73
4. Another Possible Conflict

Although not specifically outlined in any of the agreements discussed above,
another potential area of conflict between GATT and such agreements involves
manufacturing processes. For example, an agreement that attempted to use trade
sanctions to influence polluting manufacturing processes would violate GATT.74
Unclear is whether processing standards are compatible with GATT article III
requirements, especially after a GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report (discussed below) that essentially forbids distinguishing "environmentally friendly"
products from those produced in ecologically damaging ways. 75 If a processing
standard that is not justified under article III is applied to an imported product,
the action violates GATT unless it meets one of GATT's exemptions. 76 According
to one environmental economist, whether environmental damage occurs during

production or consumption should be irrelevant, because both impose some costs
on importing countries.77

C.

TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE

1. Background of the Dispute
A conflict between GATT and a U.S. environmental statute arose in 1991
involving the United States and Mexico. The United States had imposed a ban
on imports of tuna from Mexico because the Mexican tuna fleet's incidental
killing rate of dolphins during tuna harvesting exceeded the limits permitted under
the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act. 78 The Act prohibited the import of tuna
from any country with a weak policy on dolphin protection or where fishermen

72. Id. This conflict can be resolved by interpreting the "like product" language of GATT as
not including hazardous waste. Therefore, since GATT requires like treatment of like products, and
waste is not a product, trade in hazardous waste is not subject to GATT rules. Id.
73. Baker, supra note 3, at 466.
74. The product must simply meet an importer's product standards, regardless of how it was
produced. The Cost, supra note 20, at 67.
75. GATT: U.S. Seeks Review of Tuna-DolphinDecision, Ruling Said to Undermine Environment
Laws, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D4 (May 25, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Seeks Review].
76. Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 24. An argument can be made that art. III allows process
standards when applied to domestic and imported products equally because art. III recognizes regulations requiring the mixture or processing of goods in specified amounts if the regulation is not enacted
to protect domestic production. Id. An example could be a law requiring cans of tuna composed of
99% dolphin-safe tuna. Id.
77. An example is when acid rain drifts across a border or when CFCs damage the ozone layer.
GATTery v. Greenery, supra note 49, at 12.
78. Cough, supra note 2, at 28.
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destroyed more than 1.25 times as many dolphins as American fishing fleets in
the same year. 79 The ban was based on Mexico's method of harvesting tunausing nets that kill considerably more dolphins than nets used by U.S. tuna fleets.8 0
2. The Panel's Decision
The GATT dispute settlement panel concluded that the U.S. import restrictions
were inconsistent with the GATT prohibition on quantitative restrictions and that
the restrictions did not fall under the GATT article XX exemptions." The embargo
further violated GATT because it involved using trade measures to protect the
environment outside a nation's sovereign territory. 2 In addition, the ban violated
GATT because GATT allows trade sanctions to be applied only to products, not
to the method of production or harvest.8 3 As a result, the panel recommended
that the United States conform its measures to GATT obligations. 4
3. Reaction to the Decision
If the GATT Council adopts the panel's decision, 5 the Council's interpretation
of free trade provisions may profoundly affect domestic environmental initiatives
as well as international environmental treaties.8 6 Richard Mott, treaties officer
with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), said that the European Union was unlikely
to ask the Council to adopt the ruling because doing so might imperil U.S. passage
of legislation to implement the Uruguay Round.87 Critics of the decision believe
that the decision exemplifies why the environmental community is united against
GATT and provides proof that environmental laws are undermined by GATT. 8
Similarly, environmentalists are concerned that governments will no longer be
79. Trade and the Environment, supra note 10.
80. GATT Decision on Tuna May Have Implicationsfor Montreal Protocol, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE REP. 3 (1991) [hereinafter GA 77 Decision].
81. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June
1994, 33 I.L.M. 839, 888, 890, 895 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin]. The 1991 Dispute Settlement
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna appears at 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). Id. at
839. The ban was not exempt because it could not be deemed necessary to conserve dolphins.
McDonald, supra note 27, at 401.
82. McDonald, supra note 27, at 401.
83. GATTDecision, supranote 80, at 7. The decision may affect the Montreal Protocol's proposal
to ban imports from nonparties of products made with (but not necessarily containing) controlled
substances. Id.
84. Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 81, at 899.
85. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor indicated in a press release dated May 23, 1994,
that "[tihe United States will challenge the dispute settlement panel's failure to provide a fair hearing
and due process, and will ask for a full review of the report both substantively and procedurally,
by the GATT Council, or reconsideration by the panel in this case." U.S. Seeks Review, supra note
75, at D4.
86. McDonald, supra note 27, at 402.
87. U.S. Seeks Review, supra note 75, at D4.
88. Id. Stewart Hudson, legislative director for the National Wildlife Federation's international
program, said that the decision shows that GATT is not adequately equipped to deal with environmental
issues. Id.
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able to use trade restrictions to protect the regional and global environment.89
While alternatives may be available, without the threat of trade restrictions these
alternatives may not be as effective. 90
In spite of such criticisms, some environmentalists recognize that the decision
may not be an ideal test of GATT principles versus environmental protection. 9
For one reason, the decision places an unreasonable burden on a poorer country
(expecting Mexican tuna fishermen to know in advance what 1.25 times the
American dolphin kill would be). For another, killing dolphins may not be an
environmental issue where dolphins are not in danger of extinction. 92 In addition,
the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for the Environment and Natural Resources pointed out that the second panel took a closer look at environmental
issues and imposed different reasoning than the panel responsible for the 1991
ruling. 93
The ruling may have important implications for future international environmental agreements, particularly those that focus on applying trade restrictions
to production, not just products. 94 Also significant for future agreements is the
panel's apparent requirement that articles XX(b) and (g) only apply to measures
that protect "life or health" and "natural resources" within the territory of the
country imposing the regulation.95 Bear in mind, however, that GATT panels
are not bound by stare decisis. 96
While most of the basic GATT principles discussed previously remain intact
after the completion of the Uruguay Round, some changes could have profound
effects on the trade-environment relationship.
III. The Uruguay Round Agreement

A.

THE FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE ROUND

The Trade Negotiations Committee of the GATT-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round) adopted the texts in the Final Act embodying the
results of the Uruguay Round on December 15, 1993. 9' More than 108 countries

89. Cough, supra note 2, at 29.
90. Id.
91. Trade and the Environment, supra note 10, at 25.
92. Id.
93. Chris Marcich, speaking at a briefing sponsored by the Environment and Energy Study
Institute, did not elaborate on these statements. U.S. Seeks Review, supra note 75, at 3.
94. GATTDecision, supra note 80, at 7. An example involves an agreement applying restrictions
where forest products are not harvested in an environmentally suitable manner. Id.
95. Luchs, supra note 19, at 756.
96. Id. at 760.
97. Amelia Porges, IntroductoryNote to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
33 I.L.M. 1 (1994). The 22,000-page agreement is supposed to "lead to more stable, secure and
predictable conditions for trade based upon open markets and strengthened rules of competition."
Over 100 Nations, supra note 5, at D2.
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and the European Commission signed the Final Act on April 15, 1994, officially
marking the end of the Uruguay Round launched in September 1986.98
1. Ratification of the Agreement
Ratification of the Uruguay Round agreement by the U.S. Congress in December 1994 set the stage for the rest of the world to follow. 99 The Senate approved
the Uruguay Round agreement by an unexpectedly large majority, amidst much
debate and controversy.'00 For instance, U.S. Senator Bob Dole advocated that
Congress not rush to complete a major trade bill and stated that he could see no
reason why Congress could not address the issue the following year. 101In addition,
Dianne Wildman, spokesperson for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
said that nations were reluctant to remove tariffs that had protected their goods
from competition for a long time. °2
By December 31, 1994, all four members of the "Quad" group dominating
the world trade scene had confirmed their ratification of the Uruguay Round
agreement.10 3 The "Quad" group consists of the United States, the European
Union, Canada, and Japan.'04 According to GATT chief Peter Sutherland, by
December 31, 1994, at least eight-five countries had ratified or accepted the
accord.' 05
Upon ratification by a sufficient number of members, the Uruguay Round

98. Over 100 Nations, supra note 5, at D2. Officials state that the agreement is expected to
come into force when a "critical mass" of countries ratify the accord. Id.
99. U.S. Leads GA77 Ratification Rush, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at 6. Since America has
one of the largest economies in the world, without its participation, GATT would be moot. Some
Answers, supra note 1, at C8. Indeed, many trading partners of the United States were waiting to
see if Congress would approve the necessary legislation to ratify the agreement and implement it
by the end of the year. Don't Waffle Now on GATT, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at 4. The United
States also played a crucial role in bringing about the successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.
Id.
100. GATT Chief Hails Trade Deal Ratified, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 2.
101. Dole claimed that his constituents worry about the WTO and whether trade issues will
be linked with environment and labor laws. A Bad Time to Play Politics with Trade, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 1994, at 16. Dole advocated waiting to approve the trade agreement despite the facts
that the Reagan and Bush administrations negotiated the deal and that approval ordinarily would
win Republican support. Glenn Kessler, Recess Over, Congress Returns Today, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 12, 1994, at A13.
102. Jennifer Van Doren, GATT: What It Means, How It Works, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 4, 1994,
at 6C.
103. Robert Evans, Envoys Toast Birth of World Trade Body, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 31, 1994,
at D3. Envoys of the United States, the European Union, and Canada handed over the documents
confirming their ratification while toasting each other with champagne. Id.
104. Id. The European Union consists of twelve members, including Britain, France, Denmark,
Germany, The Netherlands, and Portugal. Most States in European Union Ratify GA7T, CI. TRIll.,
Dec. 23, 1994, at 7. Similar to the ratification by the U.S. Congress, Japan's lower house also
approved by a large majority the set of bills confirming the Uruguay Round. Kwan Weng Kin, Japan
Close to Ratifying Uruguay Round Pact, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 3, 1994, at 2.
105. Sutherland declares that the fact that so many countries have now ratified the agreement "is
a very good omen for the future." Evans, supra note 103, at D3.
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agreement ultimately will create a free trade area including such diverse countries
as the United States, Mexico, China,'°6 India, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.' Participating countries agree to slash tariff and nontariff barriers to world trade in
goods and services according to the terms of the Final Act. 08 In addition, the
agreement established the new World Trade Organization as successor to GATT
beginning in 1995.109
2. The World Trade Organization
a. Duties and Structure of the WTO
The WTO's duties include implementing the WTO agreement and the multilateral trade agreements and providing a forum for negotiations among its members.110 In addition, the WTO provides a framework for implementation of the
plurilateral trade agreements, and cooperates as appropriate with the Bretton
Woods institutions. ' According to a GATT symposium, the WTO has an excellent chance to erase the anomalies in the relationship between trade and the
environment. 112 At the same time, the director of the United Nations Environment

106. In order for China to be present at the creation of the WTO, it must rejoin GATT by the
end of December 1994. Reaching an Impasse: China and the GATT, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1994,
at 52. China quit the GATT in 1950 and has been seeking readmission since 1986. Id. Difficulties
between GATT and China include China's inconsistent foreign trade rules and whether China should
be considered a developing country. Id. at 52-53. As of October 21, 1995, the Chinese Government
has failed to meet "even the minimum criteria" for becoming a member of the WTO, according
to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. KantorSays ChinaNot Even Close to Meeting Criteria
for Joining WTO, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1759 (Oct. 25, 1995). Accession talks with China at
WTO headquarters, previously scheduled for October 1995, have been postponed indefinitely. Id.
107. James Goldsmith, The GATT in the Hat; The Trade Deal's "Magic" Could Make World
ProsperityDisappear,WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 25, 1994, at C3. As of October 1995, the WTO
had 109 member countries, with 22 countries officially designated inactive by the WTO, and 20
countries labeled active but with no permanent representatives. EU Trade Commissioner Outlines
Objectivesfor Post-UruguayRound Era, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1751 (Oct. 25, 1995). Some
145 countries are eventually expected to join the organization. Evans, supra note 103, at D3.
108. Goldsmith, supra note 107.
109. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organization],
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement Establishing]. Although the Final Act refers to the
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), a corrigendum adopted in conjunction with the act provides
that "all references to the Multilateral Trade Organizations,' or to its abbreviated form 'MTO,'
should be replaced throughout the Final Act and all its Annexes by the wording 'World Trade
Organization' or 'WTO,' respectively." Id. (quoting Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round)) Doc. MTN/FA/Corr. 1 (Dec. 15, 1993).
110. Agreement Establishing, supra note 109, at 1144. The first task of the WTO will be to tie
up loose ends left by the Uruguay Round. Son of GAIT: The New World Trade OrganizationNeeds
the RightPrioritiesand the Right Boss, EcONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1994, at 16. This will include negotiations
over financial services, telecommunications, shipping, and other service businesses. Id.
111. Porges, supra note 97, at 2. As the replacement for GATT, the WTO will have stronger
enforcement powers in controlling world trade, according to GATT's governing council. GATT:
Creation of GATTEnvironment Panelwith Decision-MakingPowers Urged, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA)
D5 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter GATT: Creation].
112. Symposium, supra note 11.
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Program believes that ensuring that world trade recognizes the constant rise of
environmental issues will be a major task for the WTO. "3
The WTO is conceived as a multilevel structure with many bodies. For example, a biennial Ministerial Conference is supported by a General Council to carry
out the Ministerial Conference's functions between meetings and perform specific
functions such as approval of the budget." 4 Under the General Council are separate councils for trade in goods, services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual

property rights. "5 In addition the Ministerial Conference itself can establish subordinate committees. 116 Finally, almost every agreement annexed to the WTO
creates a committee to oversee that agreement's implementation." 7
The WTO comprises one representative from each participating nation."' The
and none
WTO electorate includes over 120 nations, each having an equal vote
0
9
having veto power." A two-thirds vote is needed to take action.12
b. Dispute Resolution
The Uruguay Round agreement addresses the issue of rules and procedures
governing the settlement of disputes under the WTO.12' The Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) changes the
way GATT addresses dispute settlement. 122 First, administration of the dispute
settlement system is the responsibility of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that
a
decides by consensus. 123 A panel of three experts will consider
24 a dispute, and
seven-member standing Appellate Body may hear appeals. 1
Second, the DSU provides that all panel reports, including those of the Appel-

113. UruguayRound: UNEP Hails Completionof UruguayRound as Sign ofLink Between Environment, Trade, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D5 (Jan. 4, 1994) [hereinafter UNEP Hails].
114. Agreement Establishing, supra note 109, at 1145.
115. These councils can in turn create subsidiary bodies. Id. at 1146.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Van Doren, supra note 102, at 6C.
119. Ralph Nader, Trade in Secrets, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1994, at A31. This combination of
equal vote and no veto power gives the WTO expandable legislative, executive, and judicial power
over trade and nontrade laws. Id.
120. Van Doren, supra note 102, at 6C. The WTO enforces the rules of the Uruguay Round
agreement with a three-person WTO panel that hears trade disputes; members violating the agreement
could face economic sanctions. Id.
121. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-MultilateralTrade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 1.L.M.
112 (Jan. 1994).
122. Richard H. Steinberg, The Uruguay Round: A Legal Analysis of the Final Act, 6 INT'L Q.
No. 2, Apr. 1994, at 1, 63.
123. Id. For example, a consensus of DSB members must oppose adoption of a panel report;
otherwise the report will be adopted automatically. Id.
124. Id. at 64. An official for the WWF cites the use of expert opinion evidence and the appeals
process as positive factors of the dispute settlement process under the WTO. WWF Warns New Trade
Rules May Conflict with Existing EnvironmentalLegislation, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D6 (June 17,
1994) [hereinafter WWF Warns].
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late Body, will be adopted automatically unless opposed by a consensus of DSB
members.125 This provision may help to ensure that the dispute settlement process
will have a binding effect since it eliminates the GATT requirement that all
parties agree with the investigative panel's decision before the decision can be
implemented. 21 6 In spite of this provision, the agreement specifies that panel
reports do not amount to authoritative interpretations of the agreements involved,
implying that the reports will not be binding on countries not party to the dispute.127
Another change under the DSU involves public access to information in the
dispute settlement process. The DSU requires parties to a dispute to provide
public access to nonconfidential summaries of their panel submissions, and permits parties to provide panel submissions to the public at any time.128
3. WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment
The signing in April 1994 of the Uruguay Round agreement establishes the
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment.129 However, the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round does not include specific provisions for the inclusion of the
committee in the WTO,130 and the agreement failed to create a permanent, standing
committee on the environment as a central part of the WTO. 3' The Trade Negotiations Committee of the Uruguay Round took a decision on trade and environment
to establish a work program to identify the relationship between trade and environmental measures and make recommendations on whether modifications of the
provisions of the Multilateral Trading System are required. 132 The Trade Negotiations Committee formally approved the agreement to set up the environment
committee. 133
a. The Former GATT Committee on Environment
The WTO committee on the environment takes up where a previous one under
GATT left off, but according to a senior trade official, the new committee has
considerably wider powers. 134 The former committee worked on the relationship
125. Steinberg, supra note 122, at 63. Under the GATT rules, dispute settlement panel reports
were only adopted by consensus of all GATT Contracting Parties. Id.
126. WWF Warns, supra note 124, at D6.
127. Steinberg, supra note 122, at 64.
128. Id.
129. Symposium, supra note 11, at 503.
130. The Final Act does recognize that GATT rules may need to be updated in order to accommodate sustainable environmental development. UNEP Hails, supra note 113, at D5.
131. Other criticism of the agreement includes the following: it does not recognize the legitimacy
of existing international environmental agreements; it tightens rules so that new national environmental
standards can be challenged as trade restraints; and it allows automatic retaliation by the winning
party in trade disputes. Jessica Mathews, The Great Greenless GAT, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1994,
editorial section, at A19.
132. Steinberg, supra note 122, at 59.
133. Trade-Environment Panel's Work to Begin Soon After Mid-April Signing, 17 Int'l Envtl.

Rep. (BNA) 300 (Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Panel's Work].
134. Id. at 300.
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between trade and the environment for several years under the direction of Hidetoshi Ukawa of Japan, chair of the committee.' 35 The committee presented a
report to the annual meeting of GATT members in January 1993.136
Critics of the first committee warned that it concentrated too much on the
original items on its agenda.1 37 One item on the committee's agenda addressed

ways of combining trade provisions in existing international environmental
agreements with GATT rules. 38 In the report, Ukawa saw no contradiction between the two goals of protecting the environment and enhancing the growth of
free trade, but he acknowledged developing countries' concern that environmental
issues would be used to protect trade. 39 Another item on the agenda examined
the transparency of rules governing environmental issues in national legislation. "0
On this question, Ukawa felt certain that new regulations developed during the
Uruguay Round would be sufficient for all countries to agree, but said additional
work needed to be done to ensure that measures taken by lower government
authorities and by the private sector were included in the new Uruguay Round
regulations.' 4' The final item on the committee's agenda involved new trends in
packaging and labeling that could have environmental repercussions. 4 ' Ukawa
said that many countries had already adopted such new packaging and labeling
43
requirements, and that the new WTO regulations would speed this process.
b. The New WTO Committee on Environment

The new environment committee will have about a year to plan its work.44
Initially, the committee had no definite agenda or timetable for establishing international initiatives to minimize the current frictions between trade and environ-

135. GA7T Expected to Step up Efforts on Relationship Between Trade, Environment, 17 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 108 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter GATT Expected].
136. GATT: Creation, supra note 111, at D5.
137. Critics also said the committee should concentrate more on specific trade-related actions.
GATT Committee on Environment Told to Focus on Specifics Rather than Theory, 16 Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 761 (Oct. 20, 1993) [hereinafter GATT Committee].
138. Id.
139. Ukawa commented that conflicts should be handled on a case-by-case basis under GATT,
and eventually WTO, rules. GAT' Expected, supra note 135, at 108.
140. GATT Committee, supra note 137, at 761.
141. GATT Expected, supra note 135, at 108.
142. GATT Committee, supra note 137, at 741.
143. Ukawa cited ecolabeling as an example of one of the new requirements. GATT Expected,
supra note 135, at 14. Under this process, ecolabeling whether a product has been tested can impact
competitive conditions where the lack of the label is considered an undesirable characteristic of that
product. Id. Under the Uruguay Round, the WTO should emphasize the freedom of countries to
use labeling to draw consumers' attention to the way a product has been produced. GATTery v.
Greenery, supra note 49, at 53. Despite this alleged support, GATT already is uncomfortable with
Austria's new scheme for labeling tropical timber because the labeling is mandatory and excludes
temperate timber. Trade and the Environment, supra note 10, at 28.
144. GATT Trade-Environment Panel's Work Will Begin Soon After Mid-April Signing, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 498 (Mar. 30, 1994) [hereinafter GAT Trade-Environment].
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mental goals. 145 The WWF has suggested the delivery of a progress report after
a year and recommendations for action by member countries within two years.l4
The new committee will initially study trade-related aspects of international environmental agreements including the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention,
and CITES. 147 The committee also may look at several environmental provisions,48
such as "green taxes," to determine whether they violate free trade principles. 1
The committee will map out fields, such as environmental concerns in trade in
goods and 9in services, in which the WTO can later identify and try to correct
4
problems. 1
The first official meeting of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment
was February 16, 1995.150 At this meeting, participants elected Juan Carlos
Sanchez Arnau as chairman and drafted a work program for the next meeting.151
U.S. delegate David Shark stressed that the WTO environment committee was
not the proper forum for environmental policy making, and that the WTO should
focus on ensuring that its trade rules do not overlap with those of other international agreements. 152
The next meeting of the environment committee was April 6, 1995."' This
meeting focused on the link between existing multilateral environmental
agreements and the WTO. 154 The participants of the meeting failed to reach
agreement on the dispute between developing countries (which would prefer to
do nothing on the linkage) and industrialized countries (which would like the
WTO to exempt the trade provisions of existing environmental agreements from
the WTO rules). 15' Despite the lack of agreement on this matter, however, the
participants did agree on the need for all WTO members to report environmental
measures having significant trade effects, as well as the need for setting up
"environmental inquiry points" in each member country.56

145. A 21-member coalition, including such groups as the Center for International Environmental
Law and Greenpeace, voiced their criticism of the Uruguay Round agreement as they announced
their opposition to legislation needed to implement the agreement. GATT: Coalition of Environmental
Groups Announces Opposition to Implementing Bill, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D2 (Sept. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter GATT Coalition].
146. WWF-Set Up Panel to Tackle Trade, Environmental Issues, Bus. TiMEs, Feb. 2, 1994, at
2 [hereinafter WWF-Set Up].
147. GATT Trade-Environment, supra note 144, at 498.
148. Mike Ward, GATT Rules May Hit Basel Accord, CHEMICAL WK., May 4, 1994, at 20.
149. GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland asserts that the work of the committee will not
conflict with that of any U.N. body. GATT Trade-Environment, supra note 144, at 498.
150. WTO Committee Faces U.S. Questions on Role in Environmental Policy-Making, 18 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 158 (Feb. 22, 1995).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Panel Unable to Agree on the Link of WTO with Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements,
18 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 288 (Apr. 19, 1995).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
VOL. 30, NO. 1

GREENING GATT AFTER URUGUAY

181

The third meeting of the committee was June 21, 1995.'7 This meeting focused
on the relationship between the environment and service industries. 55 Participants
also began discussing the relationship between environmental protection and the
Trade-Related Intellectual Property section of the Uruguay Round agreement. 159
As a result of this and its other meetings, the WTO Committee on Trade and
the Environment will produce a report on the link between trade and the environment for the WTO's first ministerial meeting scheduled for December 1996.160
Because the initial mandate for the committee's work seems somewhat ambiguous, various groups call for a more specific plan of action from the committee.
For example, members of a coalition of environmental organizations 16' expect
the committee to promote reforms within the global trading system. 62 The WWF
asks the committee to address the following issues: trade-related environmental
effects of different processing and production methods; dispute settlement methods; enhancing of market access for developing nations to support sustainable
development; and ecodumping and the effect on trade flows and production cost
differentials. 163 In addition, the WWF has stressed the need for other U.N. bodies
to come
involved in the areas of environment, trade, and sustainable development 64
up with work programs complementary to that of the new committee.'
Members of the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment
(GLOBE) suggest that the committee take the following actions: develop guidelines on domestically prohibited goods and consider a ban on trade in goods that
may not be sold in the producing country; recognize the usefulness of trade
measures employed by some international environmental agreements; and define
165
when countries may adopt national environmental standards under GATT rules.
In order to ensure that the new committee is not lost in the WTO, trading partners
157. WTO Committee Takes Up Link Between Services Sector, Environment, 18 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 601 (June 28, 1995).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Members of the coalition include the Center for International Environmental Law, Defenders
of Wildlife, the Earth Island Institute, Friends of the Earth, and the World Wildlife Fund. GATT
Coalition, supra note 145, at D2.
162. In spite of these expectations, however, no clear agenda for establishing international initiatives exists that would minimize the conflicting goals of trade and environment groups. Id.
163. In addition, the WWF wants the entire process to be transparent, allowing input by nongovernmental organizations. WWF-Set Up, supra note 146, at 2. The WWF also wants to assess the
question of how to bring countries' environmental and trade policies in line when such countries do
not participate in either GATT or any international environmental agreements. GATT Committee
ContinuesDiscussionson Melding Trade, EnvironmentMatters, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 87 (Feb.
10, 1993).
164. Charles Arden-Clarke, WWF International's policy analyst, calls for permanence and a
central location for the committee in the WTO. WWF-Set Up, supra note 146, at 2.
165. GLOBE members suggest that the committee address how the prices of goods should reflect
environmental costs of production and how to prevent countries from lax enforcement of their environmental laws, which creates "pollution haven[s]." GATT: Global Legislators Seek Moratorium on
Challenges to Environment Standards, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D4 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter
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should make sure that the committee gets the funding and staff necessary to
operate successfully. 166
B.

PRAISE AND CRITICISMS FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT

1. Praise
According to GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland the Uruguay Round
agreement and the WTO provide an opportunity for people concerned with the
environment to network with GATT officials. 167 Sutherland also said that "it is
trade liberalization, not restriction, which holds the key in so many areas to
producing a coordinated policy response to environmental problems by allocating
scarce resources, including environmental resources, more efficiently and by
generating wealth.- 168 In addition, the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) praised the completion of the Uruguay Round agreement as an indication
that environmental protection needs to be aligned closely with liberalization of
trade.1 69 Finally, for environmentalists the Uruguay Round agreement represents
the beginning of recognition that international economic policies will not be
sustainable unless environmental realities are fully taken into account. 170
2. Criticism
a. In General
According to Jeffrey McNeely of the World Conservation Union, the Uruguay
Round agreement undermines international environmental agreements through

Global Legislators]. Members want the WTO's work to be more open to the public and suggest that
all subsidiary bodies of the WTO be advised by a permanent independent group of experts on the
environment and resource management. Id.
166. Recommendations must follow from the committee's work and must in turn be addressed
at ministerial meetings of the WTO in order to keep the committee and its issues at the forefront
of the WTO, at least until it begins to reach real solutions. GATT: Kantor Opposes Callfor Moratorium
on Challenges to Environmental Laws, Int'l Envtl. Daly (BNA) D3 (Mar. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
Kantor Opposes].
167. Symposium, supra note 11, at 503. Sutherland contends that trade-environment policy conflicts must be resolved in a way that does nothing to undermine the Uruguay Round's achievements.
GAiT Expected, supra note 135, at 108.
168. Sutherland spoke at a symposium organized by GATT on June 10-11, 1994. Symposium,
supra note 11, at 503. A prominent think tank gave the Uruguay Round agreement a "B +" in its
study and cited as the best facets of the deal the following provisions: sweeping tariff cuts; the new
dispute mechanism; and reforms to members' government procurement codes. GATT Deal Graded,
USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1994, at IOB [hereinafter GATT Deal].
169. According to the UNEP director, Elizabeth Dowdeswell, the first step in the greening of
trade policies emerges from inclusion of some environmental provisions such as the recognition of
the importance of environmental services. UNEP Hails, supra note 113, at D5.
170. Id. U.S. Senator Max Baucus commented that the Uruguay Round "suggests that the
agreement strikes a realistic balance, allowing neither weakening of our environmental protections
nor the use of environmental laws as disguised trade barriers." GAiT: PrivateSector Advisers Begin
Work on Reports to Congress on Agreement, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) D2 (Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter
Private Sector].
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its prohibition of trade measures that enable countries that play by the rules of

international agreements to penalize those that do not. 17 1 Similarly, the WWF
warns that new international trade rules under the WTO may conflict with existing
environmental laws, citing the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and
CITES as agreements that might be at risk. 172 The general rule that the most
recent treaty holds sway tended to protect most environmental treaties, but with
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, GATT supplants environmental agreements
as the most recent. 173 The WWF also says that the agreement poses a direct
threat to conservation efforts around the world and deals a serious setback to
environmental efforts. 174
The agreement is further criticized on the following grounds: it does not recognize the legitimacy of existing international environmental agreements; 75 it fails
to create a permanent standing committee on the environment in the center of
the WTO; and it tightens rules, enabling additional national environmental standards to be challenged as illegitimate trade restraints. 176 Environmentalists also
are disappointed by the Uruguay Round agreement because they believe that the
177
rules against trade protection are skewed against environmental protection.
b. Developing Countries
Developing countries have special concerns about the Uruguay Round
agreement. One such concern is that environmental measures will be used as a
disguise for protectionism in the new world trade order. 178 Such protectionism
in effect would allow one country to impose its environmental standards on
another. 179 Developing countries also fear that environmental concerns will be
used as a means of hampering development.180 Ravi Sharma, associate director
171. McNeely stated that trade practices need to be viewed against the overwhelming requirement
of sustainable development and adjusted when the two conflict. Symposium, supra note 11, at 503.
The think tank that gave the agreement a "B +" cited its antidumping accord and new investment
rules as the deal's worst aspects. GATT Deal, supra note 168, at BI0.
172. WWF Warns, supra note 124, at D6.
173. "Head-On" Conflict, supra note 12, at 560.
174. Private Sector, supra note 170, at D2.
175. During the seven years of Uruguay Round negotiations, seven global environmental
agreements were reached. Mathews, supra note 131, at A19. This activity can be attributed to the
realization that economic growth and human welfare will, in the long run, depend on a healthy
environment. Id.
176. One author suggests that the Uruguay Round agreement's terms and the arrangements for
the WTO show a need for the institution to drastically change its thinking and culture. Critics argue
that doing so could improve the future of the trade-environment relationship, thereby changing the
way that GATT mostly "ignores the environment." Id.
177. The Cost, supra note 20, at 67.
178. Venezuela cites the U.S. ban on foreign tuna fishermen from U.S. territorial waters (resulting
in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute) as an example of how international environmental concerns were used
for protectionist purposes. GATT: Creation, supra note 111, at D5.
179. Environment Recognized as Trade Issue, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, Oct. 21, 1991, at 738.
180. GATT Group Agrees to Step Up Work on Trade, Environment Coordination, Int'l Envtl.
Daily (BNA) DI (Dec. 7, 1992).
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at the Center for Science and the Environment in New Delhi, India, said that
GATT did not take environmental concerns into account sufficiently in its enthusiasm to complete the Uruguay Round. 81
' Similarly, the director of the Third World
Network said the final act of the Uruguay Round lacked balance, imposing clear
and sometimes onerous rules for countries of the south (thus impeding their
development) and ambiguous disciplines full of loopholes for the northern countries. 182 Sharma also criticized the bar on standards with international environmental impacts based on production processes, saying that "how things
are produced
83
can be more environmentally significant than what is made." 1
c. Developed Countries
According to Geoffrey Elliot, vice president of corporate affairs of Noranda
Forest Inc. of Canada, existing trade law is not the constraint to environmental
progress that some people believe; as a result, the WTO should ensure that
any tampering with trade rules in the name of the environment is absolutely
necessary.'84 Although Richard Gephardt, at the time U.S. House of Representatives Majority Leader, hailed the signing of the Uruguay Round agreement, he
warned that the United States should take steps to retain the basic framework of
U.S. trade law. "5 Finally, Arthur Dahl of UNEP contends that mechanisms were
needed to manage trade as a key factor in sustainability. 186 These mechanisms
could also be used to achieve international environmental targets, to prevent
export of environmental costs, or to reduce threats to global sustainability. 87
d. Dispute Settlement
Another area of criticism of the Uruguay Round agreement involves dispute
settlement. For instance, while the new dispute settlement rules under the WTO
have some positive factors, the WWF argues that additional reforms are needed to
ensure that trade liberalization does not conflict with sustainable development. 188
According to Gregory Woodhead, representative of the AFL-CIO task force on
trade, the AFL-CIO is concerned about the establishment of the WTO and a
181. Symposium, supra note 11, at 503.
182. The director also contends that the new rules attempt to negate the few gains of the south
and perpetuate an unjust international division of labor. Id.
183. Id.
184. Elliot says that no specific trade law obstacles stand in the way of individual countries pursuing
their domestic environmental objectives through direct regulation of product standards, domestic
standards for pollution, and regulations related to natural resource conservation and management.
Id.
185. Gephardt said the United States should not allow other countries to compete by degrading
the environment or lowering worker standards. Over 100 Nations, supra note 5.
186. Symposium, supra note 11, at 9.
187. Dahl mentioned CITES, the Basel Convention, and the Montreal Protocol as examples of
such trade-related mechanisms providing hope for the future. Id.
188. The WWF believes that such positive factors of the new rules are the use of expert opinion
evidence, the availability of alternative dispute resolution, and the appeals process. WWF Warns,
supra note 124, at 1.
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binding dispute mechanism, especially the expansion of the WTO's jurisdiction
over governmental practices. 89 Critics also say that WTO dispute panels could
be biased or corrupt since the public will not have access to the hearings and
some of the paperwork.19 Finally, the WWF says that environmental reforms
of the dispute settlement mechanism are needed because the mechanism will
govern enforcement of all other Uruguay Round agreements.' 9'
e. Moratorium
Some critics acted upon their opposition to the Uruguay Round agreement by
calling for a moratorium on challenges to environmental standards as unfair
barriers to trade under GATT. Members of the GLOBE called for the suspension
of challenges.' 92 Specifically, Hemmo Muntingh, president of the European
Union chapter of GLOBE, and Akiko Domoto, president of GLOBE Japan,
voiced their support for the moratorium.19 3 Despite such support, U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor opposes the moratorium, saying it could backfire
and lead to a less environmentally sound basis for implementing the Uruguay
Round agreement.'94 Although the moratorium initially should last two years
after the WTO enters into force, GLOBE members say it could be lifted earlier
if the WTO attempts to resolve trade-environment issues."'
The signing and ratification of the Uruguay Round agreement has received
and continues to receive much attention. As a result, many commentators have
made suggestions as to what they would like to see the WTO accomplish in the
future concerning international environmental agreements. Section IV examines
some of these proposals in detail.
IV. Suggestions for the Future
A. GREATER AWARENESS IN DECISION MAKING

According to many critics, GATT/WTO neither sufficiently recognizes nor
takes into account international environmental agreements or the environment
189. According to Woodhead, a consequence of the expanded jurisdiction is that the United States
would be prohibited from taking unilateral action against anything covered by the agreement. Uruguay
Round Panel, supra note 13.
190. Van Doren, supra note 102.
191. The WWF cites key reforms such as greater public access to details and settlement of disputes,
preferential treatment to developing countries during the settlement procedure, and referral of trade
disputes with environmental implications to other international dispute settlement bodies. WWF
Warns, supra note 124, at 2.
192. Members of GLOBE include legislators from the European Union, Japan, Russia, and the
United States. Global Legislators, supra note 165.
193. Muntingh stated that the E.U. Parliament would "no doubt" ask the E.U. Commission to
seek temporary suspension of challenges, and Domoto declared that -[a] moratorium is better than
no moratorium." Id.
194. Kantor believes that some nations may reject the Uruguay Round agreement because of the
moratorium and, subsequently, other nations already reluctant to address the conflict of tradeenvironment issues may refuse to negotiate further. Kantor Opposes, supra note 166.
195. Global Legislators, supra note 165.
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in general.' 96 As a result, these critics call for greater awareness of environmental
issues in GATT/WTO decision making.1 97 Ways to accomplish this goal could
include greater public access, recognition of trade restrictions, and a "green
round" of negotiations.
1. Public Access

One of the ways GATT/WTO can be more responsive to the environment and
environmentalists involves greater participation in GATT/WTO decision making.
Charles Arden-Clarke of the WWF believes that one of the key reforms for the
WTO should be to allow more public access to the details and settlement of trade
disputes, in particular those that affect the environment. 198 Similarly, some argue
that one priority for the WTO should be to change GATT's secretive procedures
to allow public scrutiny and participation up to a reasonable point.' 9 Others
should also be allowed to participate. For example, Reinhard Quick of the European Council for Chemical Industry Federations suggests that the WTO place
environmental experts on its panels and allow environmental organizations to
participate in deliberations. 200 Because the environment and trade as separate
issues seem to be of great concern to the public worldwide, on those issues taken
together the public should have some say in the decisions ultimately affecting
them.
2. Trade Restrictions

Another method of improving the relationship between trade and the environment in GATT/WTO involves recognition of international environmental
agreements. Daniel C. Esty, former official for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 01 says that GATT should set new rules enabling it to recognize
and uphold international environmental agreements that use trade restrictions for
enforcement. 20 2 Likewise, U.S. Senator Baucus wants GATT partners to commit
to protection of trade sanctions in environmental agreements. 203 While most commentators agree that GATT/WTO should not condone using general trade sanctions merely to bully other countries into adopting particular policies, they empha196. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
197. GATI" Official, supra note 6.
198. According to Arden-Clarke, this participation would include allowing nongovernmental organizations as well as the general public to participate in certain disputes. WWF Warns, supra note
124, at 2.
199. Mathews, supra note 131, at 2.
200. GATT Official, supra note 6, at 4.
201. Esty was deputy assistant administrator for policy at the Environmental Protection Agency.
GA TT: FormerEPA Official Sets Agenda for Linking Trade, Environment, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1061 (July 6, 1994) [hereinafter Former EPA Official].
202. Esty's book, DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE
FUTURE (1994), advocates substantive and procedural reforms by GATT to incorporate environmental
considerations more fully into international trade policy.
203. Private Sector, supra note 170.
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size the need for GATT/WTO to allow trade measures in certain circumstances.2 04
Indeed, to many environmentalists the critical issue is that GATT recognize and
protect the crucial role of trade sanctions in enforcement of and participation in
environmental agreements.25
Although most agree that trade restrictions are best used within the context
of environmental agreements, one drawback is that such agreements often may
be hard to reach, undermined by nonparties, or difficult to enforce among the
parties. 2°6 Trade sanctions themselves also may have a weakness. For example,
such measures are an indirect way to change another country and their effectiveness may depend upon how much the country imports.20 7 Despite the criticism,
many agree that trade restrictions through unilateral measures may be necessary
208
when diplomacy, assistance, and other avenues fail.
3. Green Round
The way for GATT/WTO members to address the previous suggestions and
further improve environmental awareness in GATT/WTO involves a new "green
round" of negotiations.2 One supporter of the idea, U.S. Senator Max Baucus,
hopes that the next GATT round becomes known as the "Green Round" because
of its environmental focus. 210 While not all of the rules emerging from such a round
would reach the highest environmental standards, some new trade agreements that
protect the global environment would assuredly be better than none.211
In addition, Arthur Dunkel, former director-general of GATT, believes that
the next GATT round of negotiations should center on the environment and
address concerns of developing countries more specifically, but that the new

204. Ian Fletcher of Britain's Department of Trade and Industry asserted that the original agreement
nearly allowed trade restrictions taken under international environmental agreements. GA7Tery v.
Greenery, supra note 49, at 53. Fletcher points out that GATT art. XX started out as art. 45 of the
Havana charter, which contained an exception covering measures taken pursuant to any intergovernmental agreement relating to conservation of fisheries resources, migratory birds, or wild animals.
Id.
205. GATT Biased, supra note 4, at 248.
206. Trade, Environment, supra note 7, at 12.
207. Sanctions can also be ineffective if exports can shift to sanction-free countries or if the
penalized company, in its attempt to cut costs, causes pollution to worsen. The Cost, supra note 20,
at 3.
208. Trade, Environment, supra note 7, at 12.
209. The "green round" is necessary to address the collision of interests of free trade and environmental protection. GATT Biased, supra note 4, at 248.
210. Baucus wants the central topic of the next round to be the concept of a GATT Environmental
Code, modeled after the current subsidies code. GAT': Baucus Urges New GAT7' Round to Consider
Environmental Code, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 31, 1991) [hereinafter Baucus Urges). Environmentalists were disappointed that the Uruguay Round of negotiations did not make a decision to
launch a "green round," setting specific goals and a completion timetable. Steinberg, supra note
122, at 59.
211. Smith, supra note 23, at 544.
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round should not have as ambitious an agenda as the Uruguay Round.212 By
focusing attention on the trade-environment relationship and its problems, a
"green round" of negotiations should be better able to come up with workable
solutions. Such solutions must be acceptable to advocates of free trade as well
as to environmentalists, for while trade is the lifeblood of many nations, repairing
and protecting the environment is the task for all nations.213 Therefore, GATT/
WTO seems to be the logical forum to conduct these negotiations since so many
nations are involved with the agreement.214
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING

1. Global Organization
Not only should GATT/WTO increase its awareness of the environment, individual nations also must do their part in order to help resolve the tradeenvironment conflict. One method of facilitating this idea involves the creation of
a global organization for the sole purpose of promoting the goals of environmental
protection and trade liberalization. 215 Such an organization could over time create
a broad, but cohesive, body of international environmental law and a set of
methodologies and procedures for individual countries to follow in striving towards its goals.216 While GATT safeguards the open world market, no comparable
system protects environmental policies and values.217 The global organization
could manage the worldwide response to environmental issues as its sole objective-a job too enormous and complicated for an organization primarily geared
toward promoting free trade to handle as an ancillary issue.218
2. NationalAgencies
Any international standards established by the global organization should be
created with regional environmental requirements and problems in mind.21 9 In
212. The Uruguay Round officially started in November 1986, and the negotiations ended on
December 15, 1993, overrunning by two years its scheduled termination date of December 1991.
UNEP Hails, supra note 113.
213. Smith, supra note 23, at 544.
214. Id.
215. According to Esty, such a "Global Environmental Organization" is necessary because existing international environmental organizations, such as the U.N. Environment Program, do not
adequately address the trade-environment relationship. Former EPA Official, supra note 201.
216. The organization initially could start out defining general environmental principles, such as
universal acceptance of the polluter-pays principle, in order to establish a framework for further
developments in international environmental law. Esty, supra note 8, at 32.
217. According to Daniel Esty, former EPA official, "the world needs GATT-like rules of mutual
economic forbearance to protect the environment." Id.
218. Former EPA Official, supra note 201. Even GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland, while
contending that no contradiction between an open trading system and international environmental
concerns exists, admits that the WTO committee on trade and the environment is not intended as a
body that will set environmental standards or policies. Trade-Environment, supra note 7, at 12.
219. Failing to keep regional issues in mind could result in declining environmental standards
and loss of national control. Henderson, supra note 17, at 30.
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order to provide for regional environmental problems and for national input and
control, the global organization would interact with individual nations through
lead agencies. Each country would create such a lead agency to coordinate national
policies on the effects of international trade on sustaining the environment.220
Each nation should be allowed to set its own environmental standards, with the
threat of a mechanism (such as the imposition of duties) available for noncompliance. 221
The national agencies would have other responsibilities relevant to the tradeenvironment issue. The agencies would conduct environmental reviews of trade
agreements and trade reviews of environmental agreements as standard procedure.222 In addition, agencies should conduct environmental impact assessments
for products traded on the international market.223 Agencies should also employ
balancing tests focusing on environmental injury and assessing competing trade
and environment principles and goals.224 Examples include testing and assessing
chemicals in accordance with internationally agreed standards before placing
them on the market and requiring environmental impact assessment planning
tools for commodities in an attempt to internalize environmental costs in market
prices. 225 The agencies should also address the following issues: including environmental costs of goods and services through taxes and other measures; choosing
low energy-intensive methods of transporting goods internationally; and making
trade proceedings more open to public-and environmental-scrutiny. 226
V. Conclusion
The political environment for greening GATT may not seem promising due
to such factors as weak environmental goals of the United States, lack of support
from the European Union, and fear of green protectionism 227 from developing

220. Symposium, supra note 11, at 7.
221. If imported products or the methods used to produce them do not meet the importing nation's
environmental standards, duties should be applied if the environmental standards have a sound scientific basis, if the same standards are applied to all competitive production in the importing country,
and if the duties are set at a level sufficient to negate any economic advantage of producing the
product under less stringent environmental protection laws. Baucus Urges, supra note 210, at 2.
222. These reviews should help reveal environmental and economic implications of the agreements
and allow public comment on those implications. Cough, supra note 2, at 28.
223. Symposium, supra note 11, at 7.
224. Former EPA Official, supra note 201.
225. Another example involves the assessment of banned or severely restricted chemicals. Symposium, supra note 11, at 8. Such an assessment would include prior notification to governments of
the intent to export, health and environmental impacts and methods for safe use in the importing
country, and provision of all available information concerning the assessment to the importing country.
Id.
226. GA7T Biased, supra note 4, at 248.
227. "Green protectionism" involves the use of environmental rationales by developed countries
to block imports of developing countries. Mathews, supra note 131, at 2.
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countries."8 Despite this grim outlook, environmentalists continue to demand a
greening of GATT (and its successor, the WTO) to reflect environmental con-

cerns. 229 On the trade side of the problem, international trade has grown twice
as fast as the global economy for the past thirty years, and this growth will
continue." 3 This growth will be facilitated in large part by the WTO, successor
to GATT and product of the Uruguay Round agreement. The Uruguay Round
agreement's lofty goals include cutting customs duties on imported goods by 38
percent, liberalizing trade in services such as tourism, and introducing more
modern trade rules.23'
Despite these benefits of the agreement, environmentalists feel let down by
it, saying that it barely touches on the environment,232 and that the status of

international environmental agreements remains unclear under the accord.233
Some critics charge the agreement with undermining international environmental
agreements.23
While half the battle lies in admitting to a problem, much still needs to be
done to solve the trade-environment conflict. As a fresh face on the scene, the
WTO has a chance to wipe out anomalies in the trade-environment relationship.235
In order to accomplish this goal, however, the WTO will need to address environmental agreements and the environment. The WTO can achieve a greater awareness of environmental issues through allowing greater public access, recognizing
the use of some trade restrictions as necessary evils, and successfully completing
a "green round" of negotiations. 236
.

228. Some say that the best hope for progress in solving the trade-environment conflict rests with
nongovernmental organizations. Id. Despite the reluctance and perceived danger, the linking of trade
with the environment is a political reality that will happen. GATT: Trading Nations Reconvene
Environment Committee, Greenwire, Oct. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, GRNWRE
File.
229. Even as they criticize GATT, environmentalists at the same time admire its power and want
to reform it to serve "green" purposes. Esty, supra note 8, at 98, 100.
230. Mathews, supra note 131, at 2.
231. GATT uses the year 2005 in its estimates because by that time the various Uruguay Round
trade liberalization measures should be implemented fully. U.S., Europe Will Be GATT's Big Winners,
Study Says, ATLANTA J., Nov. 10, 1994, at G6. The expected changes caused by the new GATT
rules include $744 billion in tariff cuts, the reduction or elimination of lavish, unnecessary subsidies
for certain goods, and a crackdown on piracy of intellectual property. Kaslow, supra note 1, at 1.
232. The Cost, supra note 20, at 67.
233. Uruguay Round Panel, supra note 13, at 1.
234. Symposium, supra note 11, at 7.
235. The Uruguay Round and the WTO provide an opportunity for negotiations between free
traders and environmentalists, according to GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland. Id. Some
commentators believe that the effectiveness of the WTO ultimately will depend on cooperation of
members, and that further negotiations will be needed to achieve objectives set out in the Uruguay
Round. Guy de Jonquieres, Dreams Behind the Scenes: Guy de Jonquieres Asks Whether GATT's
Successor, the World Trade Organization, Is Likely to Live Up to Expectations, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 5, 1995, at 19.
236. See supra notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
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The WTO cannot accomplish this goal on its own. Environmental auditing by
a global environmental organization and national lead agencies would assist the
WTO in solving the trade-environment problem.237 Trade and environmental
interests need to come together to achieve an environmentally sound world while
promoting increased trade and international competition.238 As long as the interests
remain separate and the two sides selfishly continue to advocate their own goals,
the common ground of an environmentally safe open world market can never
be reached.

237. See supra notes 218-29 and accompanying text.
238. Smith, supra note 23, at 544. According to William Reilly, administrator of the EPA, GATT
ultimately will have to recognize the importance of environmental issues as it becomes increasingly
evident that trade liberalization can have major beneficial effects on the environment. EPA's Reilly
Says, supra note 42, at 1829. The ultimate goal is to integrate environmental aspirations with economic
goals. Id.
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